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months. It started on 19 February 2020, reached its first peak at the
end of March (effective reproductive number, Re = 2.57), and after a
one-month steep drop (Re = 0.95) the curve showed an increasing
trend with the second peak at the beginning of June. However, the epi-
demic curve has had small fluctuations over the recent ten weeks
(Fig. 1). To some extent, the same pattern was observed in the number
of daily reported deaths, with a two to four-week delay and a dominant
secondary peak (Fig. 2) [1]. A sharp decreasing trend in March was
mainly due to restrictions and lockdown.
Iran is a vast country with variations in climate, cultures and sub-
cultures, and socioeconomic status. Consequently, it is not comparable
to many other countries in the world with regard to its challenges and
responses to the pandemic.
Religious festivals and ceremonies, such as groupworship and regu-
lar family parties, are among themain practices of the Iranian people. At
the beginning of the outbreak, a substantial part of the population
changed their behavior, supported by the advice of the government
and main religious leaders. In addition, schools, universities, main mar-
kets, sports centers, and even most of the governmental offices were
closed soon after the detection of the outbreak.
Forces from inside and outside of the country have affected theman-
agement of the epidemic, perhaps more so than in other countries. The
epidemic curve of Iran peaked faster than in other countries and
showed a bimodal shape before the same pattern was observed in
other counties. This issue caused high stress on the Iranian people and
authorities; Iran was even mistakenly identified by some as the source
of the epidemic for other counties [2], but later it was found that the
virus, even before formal reporting of the disease in China, was in circu-
lation in other countries [3,4]. There is no substantial evidence for the
exact starting point of the epidemic in other countries, particularly in
the Eastern Mediterranean region. However, more than half of the reg-
ular regional reports of the World Health Organization are about the
scope of the epidemic in Iran, which shows higher transparency, and
even accuracy, of statistics in Iran. Therefore, early detection and⁎ Corresponding authors.
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attributed to a functional surveillance system in the country [5].
The second wave of the disease in Iran caused a new round of
pressures, since it was a unique pattern in the world at that time.
Criticism was mainly around the impact of early reopening policies,
which was attributed as the main source of reactivation of the epi-
demic. The early reopening gave most people the impression that
the situation had become somewhat normal, and they abandoned
the health considerations they had followed for several months.
However, when the same bimodal pattern or extended epidemic
was observed in other parts of the world, the level of pressure di-
minished significantly.
Part of the high rate of reopening in Iran compared to other coun-
tries was due to the country's economic problems, which had been al-
ready exacerbated by sanctions. For the reopening, more than 2.3
million small businesses, shops and industrial units were registered,
and step-by-step reopening was accomplished. Mask mobile applica-
tion was developed and used to facilitate the process. In this nationally
used application, a map of COVID-19 cases was available for all cities
and regions of the country, and people were alarmed to avoid entering
more infected areas. People could also assess their probability of being
infected by answering the app questions on symptoms and risk factors
of COVID-19 infection.
There were some concerns in the management of the epidemic
mainly because of the lack of experience to control such an extended
and vast epidemic caused by a novel virus, and the detrimental impact
of the strict embargo against Iran.
The strong embargo imposed by the US administration, backed by a
political and mass media propaganda, diverted the type of pressure
from a justified scientific form to a distorted format. For example, Iran
did not have any access to its financial resources in the other countries
to purchase medicine, and laboratory equipment in this crucial point
of time [6,7]. Another challenge of the epidemic was to achieve a single
database for the disease. In the early months of the epidemic, different
databases were used for data entry and analysis by different medical
universities, in which the quality of data was not the same. Over time,
this problem was somewhat resolved, and a more uniform with better
quality data was achieved.
The variety of customs in different regions, such as mourning
and wedding ceremonies, have been other challenges in the-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Daily reported cases of COVID-19 in Iran.
Fig. 2. Daily reported deaths due to COVID-19 in Iran.
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idemic was not the same in all regions, and epidemic started with a
delay in some provinces which was among the reasons of the second
wave of the epidemic in Iran.
The control of the pandemic will not be achievable without the co-
operation of all countries, and if they leave each other in such a situa-
tion, managing pandemic will be difficult. The countries' experiences
in the management of the epidemic may be useful for others, though
it may not apply to all due to differences in their situation. The epidemic
curve andmanagement of the epidemic in Iran are not comparable with2
other countries. For a valid comparison of countries in managing the
COVID-19 epidemic, their conditions should be taken into account.
Overall, the response of Iran to the epidemic, given its conditions, has
been somewhat plausible and defensible.
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